by Erik K. Gustafson
Iraq’s November 2025 parliamentary election, the sixth since 2005, took place in a country enjoying hard-won stability despite regional unrest. The voting process was peaceful, and in the final results published earlier this week, Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) confirmed a significant jump in voter turnout nationwide.
The election was not a contest of ideas or policies, but a high-stakes financial transaction that reinforced the power of an entrenched political class, systematically marginalized reformers, and left a majority of eligible Iraqis disengaged.
This fragile calm, however, was punctuated by a campaign season that revealed the state’s inability or unwillingness to rein in armed groups operating outside the law. In one of the most severe incidents, unidentified attackers assassinated Baghdad councilman Safaa al-Mashhadani on October 15. A candidate for Khamis al-Khanjar’s Sovereignty Alliance, he died when a magnetic explosive device detonated under the driver’s seat of his vehicle in Tarmiyah, north of Baghdad. The blast reportedly injured four others. This was followed by an arson attack on the Sinjar office of a Yazidi candidate for the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and a shooting at the office of Muthanna al-Azzawi, a candidate for the Sunni-led Azm Alliance, which wounded two of his bodyguards. While these incidents underscore the persistent threat of violence, the 2025 election was less violent than the 2018 election cycle, which saw over 50 assassinations, and the 2021 vote, which was preceded by the intimidation and killing of activists.
This relative decline in bloodshed, however, can be misleading; it has not produced a healthier political process. The election was not a contest of ideas or policies, but a high-stakes financial transaction that reinforced the power of an entrenched political class, systematically marginalized reformers, and left a majority of eligible Iraqis disengaged. The relative peacefulness of the vote underscores a system that has learned to manage competition within a narrow, exclusive framework. This effectively freezes a problematic status quo in place—a stability that comes at a dangerously high cost. Iraqis urgently need a government capable of confronting the challenges they face, from severe water scarcity to a youth unemployment rate of 36%, and a profound governance deficit.
Putting “High” Voter Turnout in Perspective
Contrary to the predictions of many analysts – EPIC included – the initial report of a 56% voter turnout represented a significant jump from 41% in 2021. This figure defied expectations of widespread apathy and a successful boycott campaign by influential cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, with over 2.5 million more votes cast than in the previous election.
However, the 56% figure is based on a pool of registered voters that has actually shrunk, at least in part, by over 700,000 since 2021 due to a new law requiring biometric cards. This decline occurred despite roughly four million Iraqis reaching voting age in the same period.
When measured against the total eligible electorate—all Iraqis age 18 and older—the real participation rate was just 40%. While this marks a genuine increase from 36% in 2021, it means that three out of every five eligible Iraqis did not vote. This profound disillusionment, a central feature of the political landscape, reflects a deep-seated belief that the system is unresponsive and corrupt.
This widespread discontent was also reflected in the 729,923 invalid ballots recorded nationwide by the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). While such a high number of invalid votes can raise questions about administrative irregularities or potential tampering, it usually reflects a deliberate choice by voters to spoil their ballots in protest—a phenomenon particularly evident in Sulaymaniyah Province, where one in five ballots were blank/invalid. The legitimacy of the process is now under judicial review, with 400 appeals filed against the results, moving the final certification of the election into the hands of the Federal Supreme Court.
The Billion-Dollar Game: One Dollar, One Vote
The 2025 election was the most expensive in Iraq’s history. Campaigns spent an estimated $3 billion spent. This massive financial injection distorted the democratic principle of ‘one person, one vote’ by creating a system where the ability to compete for votes is auctioned to the highest bidder. Winning a single parliamentary seat in some provinces was reported to cost up to $5 million, a price tag that effectively prices out candidates without access to vast patronage networks or illicit funds, thereby nullifying the political value of an ordinary citizen’s vote.
Winning a single parliamentary seat in some provinces was reported to cost up to $5 million, a price tag that effectively prices out candidates without access to vast patronage networks or illicit funds, thereby nullifying the political value of an ordinary citizen’s vote.
As Dr. Renad Mansour of Chatham House dubbed it, this was ‘the billionaires’ election,’ where political influence became a lucrative investment opportunity, especially for wealthy Iraqis redirecting capital into domestic ventures amid U.S. banking restrictions.
This money overwhelmingly flowed from illicit sources: profits from oil smuggling, skimming from state contracts, and foreign funding tied to political agendas. The absence of effective campaign finance laws or coordinated oversight between electoral and anti-corruption bodies allowed this “dirty money” to operate with impunity. As Dr. Renad Mansour documented, “Iraq’s thriving trade in votes has evolved for the 2025 election. A black market for biometric voter cards has emerged, with investigations revealing that cards are being bought and sold for around $100 each…” The result is a vicious cycle: corruption funds political power, and that power is then used to control ministries and state resources to generate more corruption.
Stacking the Deck: How the Electoral Law Crushed Reform
A deliberate change to the electoral law explains much of the voter apathy and established parties’ dominance. In 2021, the Tishreen protests won a key reform: elections under a new single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system across 83 small districts. This system let independent candidates and new reformist movements win seats by focusing on local issues. Their success sent dozens of anti-establishment candidates to parliament. This directly threatened the entrenched political order.
In response, the major parties in the Coordination Framework colluded to reinstate the previous system in 2023. As documented by EPIC research, this reverted the country to a form of proportional representation that treats each province as a single, large constituency, a system that has historically favored larger, well-funded parties. The change made it nearly impossible for smaller groups to compete, effectively re-establishing the dominance of the major ethno-sectarian blocs. Pro-reform candidates told EPIC that under this system, winning a single seat in Baghdad requires around 20,000 votes. This threshold is insurmountable for individual parties without pooling resources into a large coalition, and stands in stark contrast to the 2021 election, where candidates in several Baghdad districts won seats with fewer than 5,000 votes, and the lowest-winning candidate secured a seat with just 2,462 votes.
The consequences were devastating. The main reformist coalition, al-Badeel (The Alternative), which represented the secular, anti-sectarian aspirations of the Tishreen movement and united 13 different pro-reform parties, failed to win a single seat. This was a crushing defeat after the previous parliament had contained a significant bloc of reform-oriented voices.
The main reformist coalition, al-Badeel (The Alternative), which represented the secular, anti-sectarian aspirations of the Tishreen movement and united 13 different pro-reform parties, failed to win a single seat.
It is also important to note that al-Badeel’s failure reflects not only the stacked system but also voter disappointment with the performance of the Tishreen candidates elected in 2021. As EPIC’s report details, these lawmakers faced immense challenges, including internal fragmentation, co-optation by powerful parties, and a lack of experience, which left them unable to translate their seats into meaningful reforms or block regressive legislation like the electoral law itself. This record of internal division and ineffectiveness likely eroded the enthusiasm of the reform movement’s core would-be supporters.
A Fragmented Victory: Why Winning the Most Seats Isn’t Enough
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition emerged with the most seats (46). While Sudani has rightly touted this as a victory, he is well aware that in Iraq’s system, it does not automatically confer the premiership. The win offers him leverage, but the true path to power lies in building a coalition that commands at least 165 votes in the 329-member Council of Representatives. While Sudani’s list leads, the broader Shia Coordination Framework (CF)—the alliance of parties that originally appointed him—collectively holds the key to a parliamentary majority. More critically, Sudani’s 46 seats represent only a fraction of the Shia vote, which was split among several powerful blocs, including Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition (29 seats) and Al-Sadiqoun (27 seats), the political wing of the Iran-aligned militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.
The next government will be formed through arduous backroom negotiations, primarily among the CF’s constituent parties. These parties are deeply suspicious of Sudani, whom they see as having grown too independent and powerful during his first term. This distrust was magnified by a 2024 wiretapping scandal, where a cell within Sudani’s own office was accused of surveilling and attempting to blackmail senior CF leaders, including Maliki. His path to a second term is not guaranteed; it depends on his willingness to make significant concessions on ministerial positions and policy to these rival factions, effectively restoring the very system of elite collusion he claimed to challenge.
Beyond a Simple Proxy War
To outside observers, this internal Shia struggle is often misinterpreted through a reductive, geopolitical lens. The notion of a binary contest for influence in Iraq, pitting the U.S. against Iran with figures like Nouri al-Maliki as simple proxies, is a misleading caricature. While Maliki engages pragmatically with Tehran, his political base and his history—including his U.S.-backed military campaigns against Shia militias in 2008—complicate the label of a pro-Iran hardliner. He is one powerbroker among many in a system designed to prevent any single leader from becoming too dominant. The Shia parties collectively prefer a prime minister who depends on their consensus, and Sudani’s relative success makes him a potential threat to that balance of power, irrespective of any external alignment.
Reassembling the Status Quo: The 224-Day Ritual
The government formation process is where the real contest begins. Since 2005, this process has averaged 224 days, as elections serve primarily to provide parties with bargaining chips for the subsequent negotiation over cabinet posts and nearly 1,000 senior government positions. Seats in parliament are just one form of leverage; elites have also historically used street mobilization and even targeted violence to preserve their influence. The entire process is a recalibration of power among the ruling blocs, who inevitably reconverge after competing separately at the polls, reassembling the same order of power in a slightly altered form.
Conclusion: Stability for the Elite, Stagnation for the State
The 2025 election has produced a familiar outcome: a fragmented parliament where the same political elite that has dominated since 2005 will spend months negotiating a government of national consensus. This process, governed by the system of muhasasa (apportionment), divides control of the state’s ministries and resources as quotas among dominant ethno-sectarian blocs. Rather than appointing leaders based on merit, powerful portfolios are allotted to parties that treat them as personal fiefdoms. While this ensures power is shared among elites, it systematically delivers poor governance, rampant corruption, and unaccountable leadership by design.
The international community’s relief at a peaceful election is understandable. However, we cannot mistake this for democratic progress. True stability requires a more solid foundation. The current system alienates 60% of the electorate. It makes a parliamentary seat cost millions. It is structurally designed to block reform. This political failure carries immense consequences. Iraq faces existential threats like a severe water crisis, rampant youth unemployment, and a debilitating reliance on oil. These challenges demand a capable and responsive government. The muhasasa system, engineered for elite power-sharing, is inherently ill-equipped to formulate the coordinated, long-term policies needed to address these challenges.
The muhasasa system, engineered for elite power-sharing, is inherently ill-equipped to formulate the coordinated, long-term policies needed to address these challenges.
The genuine, if modest, increase in voter participation shows that millions of Iraqis remain willing to engage with the political process. Whether motivated by patronage, transactional benefits, or genuine support, their votes were cast into a system designed to convert them into bargaining chips for the established elite. This dynamic, fueled by massive campaign spending and an unrepresentative electoral law, ensures that the fundamental power-sharing arrangement is reinforced, not challenged.
Ultimately, the system’s resilience in managing elite competition has come at the direct cost of its capacity to govern for the Iraqi people. Until these systemic issues are addressed, Iraq’s political stability will remain a shallow façade, lacking the broad-based legitimacy and effective governance required for long-term peace and prosperity.
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Erik K. Gustafson is EPIC’s cofounder and Executive Director.
For more post-election analysis, don’t miss “Who Really Won Iraq’s Elections?” where EPIC Director of Research and Programs Omar Al-Nidawi and Visiting Senior Fellow Ahmed Ali break down the results.