By Ahmed Ali
On November 11, Iraq heads to the polls for its sixth parliamentary election in two decades. This vote will take place at a pivotal moment: regional tensions are high, the political system remains fragile, yet the country enjoys a level of domestic security not seen in years. The elections will decide whether Baghdad can confront critical challenges such as delivering reliable electricity and clean water, tackling chronic youth unemployment, rooting out systemic corruption, and navigating a changing climate. Here are the six critical dynamics to watch as Election Day approaches.
1. The 2025 Elections: A Litmus Test for Iraqi Democracy
More than just a political contest, these elections—and the government formation process that will follow—are a vital check on the pulse of Iraqi democracy. The system has been experiencing serious setbacks over the last four years, ranging from escalating restrictions on freedom of speech to disqualification of candidates for ambiguous reasons. Public faith that elections can deliver real change remains at a historic low.
The aftermath of the 2021 elections is a cautionary tale. The transfer of power dragged on for nearly a year and was neither smooth nor entirely peaceful. After winning the largest plurality (73 seats), the Sadrists led the government formation process, forming a “Tripartite Alliance” with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and former speaker Mohammed Al-Halbusi’s Taqaddum Party.
Rival political forces coalesced to form the Coordination Framework (CF) to block Sadr’s alliance. After Muqtada al-Sadr’s bloc resigned from parliament—a move that allowed the CF to make significant gains through a redistribution of seats—the CF built a sufficient majority and ultimately formed a government with Mohammed Shya’ al-Sudani as prime minister. This process involved clashes between the Sadrists and armed groups affiliated with CF, a negative and unprecedented development for Iraqi politics.
If violent clashes and violence take place this time, this will lead to further erosion of trust in the democratic system. It is therefore imperative for political actors to contain all maneuvers and disagreement within the political space. A peaceful process is key to dissuading the public from revolting against the system.
2. A Sudani Second Term? Possible but Not Certain
Prime Minister Mohammed Shya’ al-Sudani represents a new archetype for Iraqi leadership. Unlike his predecessors, he came to office as an “inside-the-country” figure—neither an exile nor a dual national–signaling a potential shift to a new generation of leaders taking over the country’s reins. However, he arrived in office as a consensus candidate, lacking a broad popular base and operating under the tight control of the Coordination Framework.
His tenure has been defined by a paradox: navigating regional wars and tensions abroad while presiding over unusually stable security at home. Like previous prime ministers, Sudani has tried to carve out his own independence, forming his own electoral bloc, the Reconstruction and Development Coalition (RDC). The central question post-election is whether Sudani will secure a second term or be replaced by a different, similarly pliable candidate from within the Shia political scene. By most estimates, he has a 50-50 chance of retaining his position. If his RDC underperforms, however, those chances will decrease. Should it fail to win at least 60 seats, the more powerful political forces within the CF would find it easy to marginalize Sudani and deny him a second term. They will likely look for other “inside-the-country” candidates from the rising generation of Iraqi Shia political leaders.
3. Iraqi Shia Politics: A High-Stakes Game of Thrones
All Iraqi Shia political forces, even those close to Iran, are running separately in these elections. This contrasts with previous elections where pro-Iran groups coalesced into a single coalition and competed against the Sadrists. It is clear that groups like the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH), former PM Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law (SoL), Sudani’s RDC, and Amaar al-Hakim’s Hikma Trend are out to test their power.
With their primary rival, the Sadrists, boycotting the race, the path is clear for these groups to win a majority of the Shia vote. Yet, the specter of Muqtada al-Sadr looms large. This summer, he urged supporters to back “non-corrupt” candidates and initiated a voter registration drive, despite his movement’s official boycott. A last-minute directive from Sadr, ordering his massive base to vote for a newly designated ally, could upend the entire election.
4. Iraqi Sunnis: Quest for Leadership
For Iraq’s Sunni heartlands, this election will be a decisive leadership contest. The main prize will be the office of Speaker of Parliament. Despite his ouster by a court decision in 2023, former Speaker Mohammed Al-Halbousi proved not just his staying power but an ability to expand his support base. With its gains in the December 2023 provincial elections, his Taqaddum Party now controls senior local government posts in Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, and Kirkuk.
His rivals want to weaken him, but this has proven to be a difficult task. To be sure, they are giving it their best. Khamis al-Khanjar’s Siyada Coalition and Muthana Al-Samarie’s Azam Coalition are the top contenders. Their goal is to curb Halbousi’s ambitions and position themselves to seize the speakership. This election is a direct referendum on Halbousi’s enduring power.
5. Iraqi Kurds: The Unshaken Paradigm
In the Kurdistan Region and among Kurdish voters, big surprises are unlikely. The political landscape remains dominated by the historic rivalry between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). To their credit, opposition forces such as the New Generation Movement are challenging the ruling parties’ dominance. But defeating the ruling parties is as daunting as a climb up the legendary—and sometime unreachable—peaks of the Kurdistan Region. The opposition lacks the vast patronage networks and mobilization machinery of the KDP and PUK. Without these resources, they have struggled to motivate independent, yet disenchanted, voters to become more involved in politics.
6. The Tishreeni Forces: A Test of Longevity
The pro-reform forces that emerged from the 2019-2021 Tishreen protest movement have had four challenging years. They deserve respect for staying engaged in politics despite formidable obstacles.
Their entry into parliament in 2021 was itself a victory, fueled by public hope and hard-fought electoral reforms won by their protest movement. However, their tenure has been defined by unmet expectations. While opposition parties born from the movement—Imtidad and Ishraqat Kanoon—won 9 and 6 seats respectively, those numbers fell far short of the voting bloc needed to form a formidable opposition in the 329-member Council of Representatives, even if the 43 independent MPs had joined their cause. Inexperience and internal divisions presented additional challenges. But for the most part, their failure is the result of facing an entrenched system that is highly resistant, and often hostile, to reform.
A critical setback occurred when Muqtada al-Sadr’s bloc resigned from parliament, a move that paradoxically consolidated power for the established, Iran-aligned parties of the Coordination Framework. This empowered ruling majority then reversed the key electoral reforms that had allowed smaller parties and independents to win seats, which poses an additional challenge for Tishreenis on November 11.
For Tishreenis, the 2025 elections are realistically about political survival. The most promising development is the formation of a sizeable pro-reform coalition, al-Badeel, which will compete across several provinces. Yet, electoral performance is only half the battle. The true key to al-Badeel’s future—and that of the boarder movement—is its ability to maintain cohesion in the weeks and months after the elections. If it fails this test, the Tishreeni movement may struggle to remain politically relevant.
Ahmed Ali is a Visiting Senior Fellow at EPIC.